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Case No. 11788 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
•• 0 •• 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Tr.is is a reply brief in answer to the allegaticns 
and arguments as set forth in the brief of the resp<n-
:ient. 
POINT 1 
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THIS APPEAL ARE JUSI'ICliBLE 
Respondent suggests that appellant should have 
appealed the errors connected With his 
::uilty plea, and that this appeal should be dismissed 
1. 
because he failed to do so. Respcndent cites Bryant 
\ .• Turner, 19 u. 284, v. Turner, 21 u. 2d 96, 
in support of this claim. 
However, the sentence which appellant is serving 
in the Utah State R-ison wa.s imposed ai March 14, 1966. 
l"l 1967, the supplement to vol. 8 u.c • .A.. was published, 
which contain.ed guidelines for the acceptm ce or 
pleas by Utah trial courts (77-24-6, u.c.A.., 1967 supp.). 
Ju-ring the summer of 1969, and after appellant had 
filed his notice of appeal in this case, BOJkin v. 
395 u.s. 238, and Belgard v. Turner, Case No. C 
95-69 (n.c. Utah), were both decided by the courts. 
This appeal is valid and complies with Brya.nt be-
ca.use, in additicn to a denial of due process, unusual 
circumstances are present in this case. 
The past few years have witnessed a number of new 
legal guidelineg written by the u.s. Suprens Court, and 
the application of these standards to existing law has 
substantially revised the scope of judicial review. 
kppellant was not able to anticipate these future court 
decisions regarding constitutional guarantees for aie 
r1ho plead guilty, and lo did not at the time tmder-
:;tand the nature and extent of the errors stated L'l 
trJs appeal. 
'I''herefore, the issues presented in this appeal are 
:iot judicata, because tmtil these court decisicns 
a trial court's duties with regard to 
ta.."1.ce of guilty pleas were published, the nature of 
the errors stated in this appeal and their relaticn to 
t'.le ccnstitutianaJ._ guarantees as explained in Boykin 
cr.d Belgard were not "something which (was) lmown or 
should be lmawn • • • at the time judgment was entered," 
so this appeal is in accordance with the principles 
s-':.ated in Brown v. Turner, supra, by virtue of the 
r-1le of law set forth in L:inkletter v. Walker, 361 
D.S. 618 (1965). 
POINT 11 
1 OF APPELLANT 1 S BRIEF IS A VALID ISSUE 
Appellant is appealing an order of disr.Ii.ssal of 
his petiticn for a writ of habeas corpus (Uo. 185104, 
April 16, 1969) wherein the Stewart M. Han-
sen stated: 
"• • • the petiticner was properly sentenced, 
tha.t he :!!!£:l competent counsel • 
(Emphasis added.) • • • • 
S:i.:1cc this was the conclusicn of the 1CJ11er court, and 
t:1e grmmds upon Which the peti ticn was denied, the 
'.luesticn of the adequacy of defense counsel must, of 
:iecessi ty, be considered an integral pa.rt of the pro-
ceedi. ngs, and the ref ore is subject to attack en appeal. 
Also, appeal is a right, and gull.!"a:nteed under uta-i 
law by Secticn 77-1-8(7), u.c.A.(Vol. 8). 
POillT lll 
WAS Nor REPRESOOED BY CDUNSEL 
When a defendant enters a plea of guilty in court, 
proceedings are usually, as in appell.a.nt•s case, 
su,inna.ry·, and the gravity of the errors comctl.tted may 
not be ¥P<irent until after the hearing is canpleted. 
Unlike the case of People v. IG.imek, 172 Cal. !pp. 
2d 36, which was a jury trial and continued far a ccm-
siderable of time, appellant •s appearances in 
court generally lasted for only a matter of a few min-
utes, and he did not completely understand the nature 
of the proceedings or realize their outoome. 
In addition, appellant did not believe that he was 
4. 
recrJ.ired i:o enter objections and, in effect, ccnduct 
'.d.s own defense, for he assumed that his court appoint-
ed attorney would see that his rights were protected 
and properly represent him. 
This Court has explored this matter in the case of 
State v. Mannion, 19 u. SOS, and therein declareda -
11That which law requires and makes- essential 
en trial of defendant, charged with felcny, 
cannot be dispensed 1li. th, either by ccnsent 
of defendant or by his failure to object to 
mauthorized methods pursued by those in 
authori ty.n 
(As cited in Vol. 8, u.c.A., Secticn 77-1-8, 1.) 
Before appearing in court to change his plea, appel-
13.nt ha.d been advised and assured by Mr. Mitsunaga, his 
court appointed counsel, that he could expect cledncy 
from the court by so pleading and that such clemency 
would be in the f orrn of a sentence in the County Jail 
on a misdemeanor charge. This is substantiated in part 
'Jy h of the transcript of the hearing (respcndant •s 
supplemental record) where Nir. Mitsmaga requested that 
the court refer appellant's case to the probation and 
parole department. 
Such inducements by attorneys to pursuade a defen-
dant to change his plea. were reeoently ruled to be 
u:.1constit.utional by the Supreme Court of Missouri in 
v. 440 s.w. 2d 441, and the court said, in 
essence, that: 
''Proof that defendant's guilty plea was in-
d11ced by his attorney's assurances that pro-
ba. tion muld be granted would entitle 
defendant to vacatur of his plea." 
(Quoted from Criminal Law Bulletin, Sept., 
1969, P• 442.) 
While probatim was not expressly promised in this 
case by cotmsel, clemency in the form of a light sen-
tence was used to effect a change of plea. 
However, at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Mitsmaga was 
absent, and the court made no reference to a.rry report 
that may have been received from the probaticn depart-
ment, nor were any other matters mentioned, either by 
the court or by cotmsel, touch:U:lg en the circumstances 
of case regarding recormnendations or possibilities 
')-'. probation, leniency, or a possible jail sentence. 
In this particular case, the sentencing sessicn was 
probably the most crucial stage of the court proceedings; 
and Mr. Mitsunaga, who was fanrl.liar with all of the 
aspects and ramifications concerning the case, was not 
pi:"esent in order to insure that his promises of leniency 
6. 
crr his request for a recornmendaticn by the probaticn 
department had been looked llito by the court. Such an 
error was ccnsid.ered unccnsti tuticnaJ.. as violating a 
defendant's Sixth Amendimnt guarantees v. 
S:nith, 4ll F. 2d 733 (6th Cir., 1969), where tha court -
held that defence counsel's invollllltary absence because 
of illness at the time when the jury verdict was r&-
tu.med was a denial of the right to effective assistance 
of comsel at all critical stages of the proceedings 
agaiinst him, and the district judge's polling of the 
jury did not cure the error. 
Appellant submits that his counsel's absence at 
tne sentencing hearing was an error even more grmre 
that which took place in Smith, for it was appel-
la.nt 1 s trust in the promises and assurances of defence 
counsel that caused the guilty plea to be entered. 
Utah law is also explicit en this matter, for a 
c0llateral reference in 77-1-8, u.c.A. (Vol. 8), alludes 
to 28 A.L.R. 2d 1240, by quoting: 
"Absence of counsel for accused at time 




APPELLANT WAS Nor FULLY ADVISE:D OF THE 
C01JSEQUEHCES OF HIS GUILTY PLEA 
The respondent alleges th:l.t appellant was thoroughly 
ad'rised of the consequences of his guilty plea, and has 
submitted a transcript of the proceed!l.ngs to substa.."1.t-
:.ate this claim. (This transcript, incidently, is in-
correct.) 
A reading of this reoord will, however, show that 
appellant's case is not dissimi.J.a.r to that of Belgard 
v. Turner, Case No. C 95-69 (D.C. Utah), in that nowhere 
:L."1 the record is there a:rry indication that appellant 
was advised of any ccnstituticnal rights, or that he 
mlderstood the nature of the charge. He was cnly told 
t'.iat he might be sent to prison. 
This was a deciding factor in Belgard, as t:he court 
e;-:-ola.:ined on pages 7, 8 and 9 of the opinicn: 
ltQi such a record, serious questicns arise 
as to the voll.ll'ltariness and particularly as to 
the l.ll'lderstanding nature (Sic) of the plea • • 
• • Unlike the record in (Boyidn v. Ala-
395 u.s. 238), the record before us here 
is not silent , but it is hardly better and in 
some respects it is worse, than a silent record. 
Without leaving the m:i.tter to a of 
sumpticn or supposi.. ticn, perhaps ccnsistent 
8. 
-with the idea that advice actc:all:y wi.s ve:i, 
the record express1y shews that tLe plaini:iff 
did not have explained to hir.: the nature of 
tLe charr:e, about possible defer.ses, 
• • • and other matters which would be neces-
sary to understand in order to render a nle'l 
The .J!l.J:r vital the. plain-
t:_ff >1as told was the extent of ti1e nossible 
prnush."'.lent ••• •" · 
'l'he record in the present case, as in Bel.;;ard, does 
rec, show that appellant was advised of any 
::.:::-':,eed by the Constitution; and this was held by the 
:·,s, Supreme Court in Boykin to be requisite for an 
intelli.ri:ent waiver. These riGhts include: the privi-
::..er:e a':'a5nst compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed 
by tl:e Fifth Amendment and applicable to the States by 
r-c1.scr.. of the Fourtee!'lth. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 u.s. 1. 
'"'.'\o rir'i1t to a trial by jury. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
' • S. 145. The rie;ht to confront cme 1 s accusers. 
2',_:_r:ter v. Te,"'\:as, 380 U.S. 400. 
CC)Jile rights and privileges are also assi.:.red 
'.r A..i.-ticle 1, Secticms 7 and J2 o-f.' the Cansti tutian of 
:.·tah, a."ld by Section 77-l-8, U .c .A. (Vol. S). 
Appellroit su'bnits that he was not advised of the 
of the char::;e to which he entered a plea of 
-- il ty, and was not advised of his rir,hts in relation 
to this charge and the plea entered thereto; especially 
since appellant has only just discovered that in order 
for a crime of theft to constitute grand larceny, the 
money or property taken must exceed the value of fifty 
dollars, and the amount allegedly stolen by appellant 
and his co-defendant in the crime lli. th which he was 
charged and to which he plead guil.ty was les1 than thirty 
dollars. 
The court did not seek to determine whether grand 
larceny as defined in Section 76-36-h(l)(Vol. 81 U.C..t.) 
actually bad been colllmitted, and al.so did not advise 
that if less than fifty dollars was inTI>lved 
in the theft, he could not be guil.ty of grand larcell1', 
and therefore he did not make a knowledgeable waiver or 
enter a valid plea to this charge, as al'oresaid. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing, in addition to his brief, appel-
lant suggests that he bas been substantially denied due 
process and equal protection of the laws, in that he 
was not made aware of the fact that the crime with which 
he was charged could not be construed as grand larceny 
because the amount taken was leu than .fifty dollars. 
10;. 
consequently, the sentence imposed by the lower court 
,,,15 not only improper; it was illegal. .lppellant 
therefore again urges this Court to reverse the decision 
of the lower court and set aside his plea of guilty. 
R&spectfUlly submitted, 
Pro Se 
December ll, 1969 
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